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Vol. XIX APRIL, 1934 No. 3
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN MATTERS OF PROCEDURE AND
CONTROL OF THE BAR*
BY LouIs SHANFELD
Recently the administration of justice has received much criti-
cism and discussion. Both the laymen and the lawyer have urged
reform in the machinery of the judiciary. The phases of this
machinery that have been most criticised are the regulation of
procedure and the bar. Since the judiciary has borne the brunt
of the criticism, it is faced with the problem of correction and re-
form. The issue is presented to what extent the judiciary may
correct and reform independently of the legislature under our
governmental distribution of powers. The extent of the judicial
powers to regulate procedural matters and problems of the bar is
determined by how defined and distinct these powers were at the
time our independence was established. In State v. Harmon' it
is said: "What constitutes judicial power, within the meaning of
the Constitution, is to be determined in the light of the common
law and of the history of our institutions as they existed anterior
to and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." As a
practical matter, not all governmental functions can be strictly
classified. There are many powers which fall within the pe-
ripheral zones of judicial and legislative functions. 2 Historically
* The case of In re Richards, decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri
subsequent to the writing of this article, is an enunciation of the doctrine of
judicial independence by that court. See, Comment (1934) 19 ST. Louis LAW
REVIEW 146.
1 (1877) 31 Ohio 250.
2 Hampton v. U. S. (1928) 276 U. S. 394; In re Richardson (1928) 247
N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655.
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the regulation of procedural matters is illustrative of such a
power.
At common law the power of regulation of procedure was con-
sidered a judicial power, or at least it was never considered dis-
tinctively legislative.3 History reveals, that as far back as the
days of Richard II, rules of procedure had been promulgated by
the judges. 4 Mr. Morgan says :5 "Anciently, regulation of plead-
ing and practice were principally of judicial origin. Some were
the result of judicial decisions in individual cases; others were
court rules formally declared; some few were enactments of
Parliament, the latter of which were attempts to mitigate some
of the most technical of the asperities." This common law back-
ground illustrates that the judiciary regulated procedure subject
to Parliamentary supervision. The common law's inclination to-
wards logic created the inelasticity and rigidity which prompted
acts by Parliament. These acts were intended to aid and not ab-
rogate the power in the courts to regulate procedure. 6 The Civil
Procedure Act of 1833 recognizes this inherent right in the courts.
In 1873, the English system was modified so as to create an ad-
ministrative body composed of members of the bench, the bar, and
the executive departments, to enact rules of procedure for the
courts.
The courts of this country followed the common law judicial
decision method of procedure regulation until the code reform
movement started in New York in 1848. This movement, result-
ing in legislative regulation of every detail of the adjective law,
spread rapidly in the American states; but enthusiasm for the
system was short-lived because this method proved as cumber-
some and as inelastic as the system it replaced. Legislative regu-
lation of procedure has seldom been questioned. Our heritage of
the English system included, as we have seen, a dual control of
the regulation of procedure. Parliamentary regulation is not a
criterion to establish a legislative power. Parliament possesses
omnipotent powers; the English courts are but instruments in the
exercise of that power and thus entirely within the control of
3 Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure (1916) 10 InI. L. Rev. 171.4 Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure (1918) 2 Minn. L.
Rev. 80.
5 See note 4, supra.
6 Sunderland, Machinery of Procedural Reform (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev.
295.
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Parliament. Under the framework of our governments, national
and state, the legislature and the judiciary are co-ordinate and
independent. The transcendent powers of Parliament did not
devolve upon the legislatures but upon the people. 7 In our con-
stitutional governments, no one department possessed superior
power; each was limited. If the judiciary regulated procedure
at common law, the exercise of this power by legal logic belongs
to the judicial department of our governments. 8 There may al-
ways be constitutional revision. Legal logic is, however, over-
powered by actual legislative regulation of procedure. In fact,
our inclination to believe that legislative codes are the only way
in which court procedure can be prescribed is a result of the long
duration of such control acquiesced in by the courts.9 It is legis-
lative regulation that has been so recently criticised. This his-
torical legislative exercise will to some extent impair independent
judicial regulation.
The existence of a dual capacity to regulate procedure is
brought out in those cases dealing with the constitutionality of
what is regarded as an exclusive legislative power. In the federal
courts, the history of judicial independence in matters of pro-
cedure dates from 1789 when the Judicial Code was enacted. In
Wayman v. Southard, 1) the delegation of the power to make rules
in the Judiciary Act to the courts was upheld as the delegation of
an act not "strictly and exclusively legislative." Construing the
same Act, the Supreme Court had held that "Congress might
regulate the whole practice of the courts, if it was deemed expedi-
ent so to do; but this power is vested in the courts."1 1 Since the
Constitution grants to Congress the right to create inferior fed-
eral courts, their scope of independence in these matters is sub-
ject to Congressional supervision. But the Supreme Court has
established its right to regulate its procedure independently. In
1792, the Attorney-General of the United States requested in-
formation concerning the rules and regulations of the Supreme
Court. It was said that the court considered the practice of the
courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording
7 Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila. (1853) 21 Pa. 147.
8 Wigmore, Constitutionality of Leg. Regulation of Procedure (1929)
23 Ill. L. Rev. 276.
9 Paul, Rule Making Power of the Courts (1926) 1 Wash. L. Rev. 163, 223.
10 (1825) 10 Wheat. 1.
11 Bank of U. S. v. Halstead (1825) 10 Wheat. 51.
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outlines for the practice of this court; and that they would from
time to time make such alterations therein as circumstances might
render necessary.' 2 Its appellate procedure is, however, subject
to legislative regulation.13
State legislative enactments, transferring a rule making power
in regard to procedure, have brought up the constitutional ques-
tions of delegation of that power by the legislature and the inde-
pendence of the judiciary in its exercise of the power. If its
right to exercise the power is to be determined principally by
the constitutional issue whether the power may be delegated to it,
then the judiciary possesses little independence in this field. The
body that delegates may withdraw. The common law back-
ground is resorted to in order to sustain the delegation. In a re-
cent Wisconsin case, 14 where the state constitution contained no
expression on the power to regulate procedure, it was said:
"Where the power is not exclusively committed to any one depart-
ment, it may be co-operatively enforced, responsively to the needs
of society." Not all powers are expressly given by constitutions.
There are implied and inherent powers.15 Ancient custom and
practice determine what are implied and inherent powers. The
legislature is said to have all powers not given to another de-
partment nor denied to it. This does not mean that such grant
or denial may not be implied or inherent. "The Constitution
does not attempt to make an abstract distribution of govern-
mental functions."'16 This Wisconsin case upheld the delegation
of the power to regulate procedure on the ground that at the
time the Constitution was adopted, this power was considered
essentially a judicial power or "at least not a strictly legislative
power." In 1925, the Legislature of Washington enacted a
statute transferring power to make rules of practice and pro-
cedure to the courts. 17  In State ex rel. Foster-Wvman v. Superior
Court,'8 this statute was sustained as not an improper delegation
22 Hayburn's Case (1792) 2 Dallas 411. See Pound, Regulation of Jud.
Procedure, note 3, supra. Since 1822, the Supreme Court has regulated pro-
cedure in equity for federal courts.
13 Ex parte McCardle (1869) 7 Wall. 506.
14 In re Constitutionality of a Wisconsin Statute (1931) 204 Wis. 501, 236
N. W. 717.
15 McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
Is State v. Bates (1905) 96 Minn. 110, 104 N. W. 709.
17 Laws 1925, c. 118.
Is (1928) 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770.
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of legislative power although the legislature formerly functioned
as the source of such rules; and it was held that they did not per-
form an act exclusively legislative. In both the Wisconsin and
Washington cases, it is seen that the powers of the legislature
over regulation of procedure was not challenged. In both, the
power was recognized as subject to concurrent regulation; but the
holdings sustain the conclusion that the judicial participation in
this regulation is dependent upon the will of the legislature. Yet
courts of New York and Colorado have sustained these statutes
under similar constitutional provisions as the grant of a power
which their courts possessed independently and inherently. In
Hanna v. Mitchell,19 the decision was based on this inherent
power of the courts, although rule making powers had been au-
thorized by the statute. The court said: "The power to make
rules governing the practice and procedure in the courts is a ju-
dicial and not a legislative power. This was clearly recognized
when the Code of Procedure was authorized to be adopted by the
legislature. The federal Constitution (Art. 3, sections 1 and 2)
seems to give greater power to Congress over the proceedings in
the federal courts than is given by the state Constitution to the
Legislature. . . ." In the more recent case of People v. Kolk-
man,20 the court considered the effect of a statute which stated:
"The supreme court shall prescribe rules of practice and proced-
ure in all courts of records and may change or rescind the same.
Such rules shall supersede any statute in conflict therewith." 21
The Supreme Court then enacted the following rule: "14 (b). The
rules governing comments by district judges shall be those now
in force in the United States district courts." A comment by a
trial judge pursuant to this rule was upheld. Preceding publi-
cation of the decision, the legislature amended its statute so as to
nullify this rule permitting comments. The opinion of the court
then asserted its independence to formulate rules of procedure
"irrespective of the statute and the common law, but in con-
formity with constitutional provisions. . . . This is inherent
in the judicial department." In effect, the statute was held
declaratory of a power possessed by the court under its inherent
19 (1922) 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N. Y. S. 43.
20 (1931) 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575. See comment (1933) 16 Jr. of Am.
Jud. Soc. 151.
21 Laws 1913, p. 447, now embodied in (1921) Code Civ. Proc. sec. 444.
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power. The legislature could not abrogate this rule. The ma-
jority opinion did not hold as to whether the judicial power was
exclusive. The dissenting opinions, however, did treat the opin-
ion as holding that the power was exclusively in the judiciary on
the ground that the power to override legislative enactments was
the assumption of absolute power. In an earlier case, 22 the Colo-
rado court held, in its majority opinion, that a statute regulating
procedure in a divorce trial was invalid since the legislature had
granted all rule making power to the courts with reference to
procedure. The dissent held that what the legislature granted
it could take away. On the rehearing the majority held that
nothing said by it in its opinion was to reflect on the Code of
Colorado. In view of these decisions, it cannot be said that Colo-
rado holds the judiciary invested with independent and exclusive
powers over matters of procedure. State iv. Kolkman is, how-
ever, a remarkable assertion of the judicial independence in this
phase of administration of justice.
Although courts respect legislative regulation of adjective law
pertaining to procedure, they generally are not hesitant to assert
an exclusive independence in routine procedural matters. In
Hoopes v. Bradshaw,23 the court said: "There are certain func-
tions of the lower courts with which the legislature cannot inter-
fere, one of them being the power to adopt rules to facilitate the
proper dispatch of the business of such tribunals, such as in-
stances of regulations relating to the service of notices and
papers." In a case holding a legislative act requiring the courts
to give their decisions in writing invalid, Justice Field said, "but
where is the limit if its exercise in any particular be admitted." 24
Instances where legislative enactments provided that judges
should write headnotes to their opinions, 25 that the court should
reopen and rehear certain cases, 26 that the court should treat the
verdict of the jury with a certain weight,27 that there should be
limitations of time for argument,28 that the court should grant
22 Walton v. Walton (Colo. 1929) 278 Pac. 780.
23 (1911) 231 Pa. 485, 80 Atl. 1098.24 Houston v. Williams (1859) 13 Cal. 24. See also Vaugn v. Harp (1857)
49 Ark. 160, 4 S. W. 751.25 Ex parte Griffiths (1889) 118 Ind. 83, 20 N. E. 513.
26 Dorsey v. Gary (1872) 37 Md. 79; Dorsey v. Dorsey (1892) 77 Md. 64.
27 State v. Aetna Casualty Co. (Fla. 1922) 92 So. 87.
28 Cobb Chocolate Co. v. Knudson (1904) 207 Ill. 452, 69 N. E. 816; Reagan
v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1904) 180 Mo. 117, 79 S. W. 435.
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an appeal in specified cases, 29 that the court should be limited in
vacating or modifying its judgment after term,30 or that the
court should be limited in granting a continuance pending case, 31
are examples of what courts uphold as exclusively within their
regulation.3 2 Legislative granting of new trials 33 or determina-
tions of proper parties 34 are further illustrations of what courts
regard as violative of the principle of the separation of powers.
In Epstein v. State,35 the court said: "It is not a legislative func-
tion to make rules for the court, or to say what the courts shall
consider a sufficient brief." A legislative act abrogating a Su-
preme Court rule requiring briefs of counsel to contain concise
statements of errors and exceptions was held invalid.36 Courts
differ as to the validity of a statute prohibiting suspension of im-
position of sentence in criminal cases,37 but generally sustained
a statute prohibiting the power to suspend the execution of an
imposed sentence.38 Courts have also asserted an independence on
issues of venue.3 9 They also reserve to themselves the probative
value of evidence, 40 although they respect legislative determina-
tions of what shall be evidence. 41 In matters relating to con-
tempt proceedings, the judiciary has generally restrained legis-
lation on the ground that regulation of contempts is an inherent
29 Miller v. State (1849) 33 Md. 116.
30 Tuck v. Chapple (1926) 114 Oh. St. 166, 151 N. E. 48.
31 Burt v. Williams (1863) 24 Ark. 91.
32 Other instances: People v. Buener (1931) 343 Ill. 146, 175 N. E. 400,
providing that jury shall be judges of law and fact; Atchison etc. R. Cu. v.
Long (Ok. 1926) 251 Pac. 487, providing for appeals within a certain time.
33 De Chastellux v. Fairchild (1850) 18 Pa. St. 18; Taylor v. Place (1856)
4 R. I. 324; Merrill v. Sherburne (1818) 1 N. H. 199.
34 Hay v. Issetts (Fla. 1929) 125 So. 237.
35 (Ind. 1920) 128 N. E. 353.
36 Also: Lacy v. State (1928) 195 N. C. 284, 141 S. E. 886; Davis v. State
(Ind. 1920) 128 N. E. 354. Contra: Covingtonv. Home Hosiery Mills (1928)
195 N. C. 478, 142 S. E. 705; Kidd v. Jacksonville (Fla. 1930) 128 So. 31.
37 Cases sustaining validity: People v. Ct. of Sessions (1894) 141 N. Y.
291, 36 N. E. 386; Iowa v. Voss (1890) 80 Ia. 467; See Gelismann v. Osborne
(1924) 79 N. J. E. 430, 82 Atl. 424. Contra: People v. Allen (1895) 155 Ill.
61, 39 N. E. 568; People v. Brown (1884) 54 Mich. 15, 19 N. W. 571; State v.
Hockett (1907) 129 Mo. App. 639, 108 S. W. 599.
3 Ex parte U. S. (1916) 242 U. S. 26; Madjorous v. State (Ohio 1924)
156 N. E. 916.
39 State v. Curtis (Mo. 1920) 4 S. W. (2d) 467; Farmer v. Christian (Va.
1930) 152 S. E. 383.
40 Johnson v. Theodoron (1927) 324 Ill. 543, 155 N. E. 481.
41 Roth v. Gabbert (1894) 121 Mo. 162,27 S. W. 528; Corbin v. Hill (1877)
21 Ia. 70; U. S. v. Klein (1871) 80 U. S. 128; State v. Torrello (Conn. 1925)
131 At]. 428.
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power of the court; 42 that they interfere with the orderly con-
duct of the business of a coordinate and independent depart-
ment.48 Congressional regulation of contempt in federal courts
to the extent of providing for a jury in criminal contempts has
been upheld.44 In Ex parte Garner,41 a state legislative act regu-
lating procedure and the maximum punishment for contempts was
upheld. A Missouri case upholds a statute limiting judicial
power to punish constructive contempts. 46 But the courts gen-
erally deny statutes providing for jury trials in indirect con-
tempts.47
Judicial declarations of independence in these matters are made
in order to establish an effective and unfettered administration
of justice. Legislative acts are held unconstitutional because
they infringe on judicial matters held to be exclusively committed
to the judiciary. Based on English history, there was no distinc-
tion between routine and adjective matters of procedure. It
would seem that the courts could, without legislative action, set
up organizations to regulate all procedure, such as Parliament
has set up in England. Historical practice, however, will influence
us to apply to the legislature for action. In the American states,
just as the common law method was supplanted by legislative
regulation, the latter is being supplanted by judicial councils,
somewhat similar to the English administrative body for the mak-
ing of rules of court.48 Practices in states like Colorado, where
the legislature has transferred all rule making to courts, and
New Jersey, where the legislature has enacted a short practice
act concerned only with the fundamentals of procedure, thus leav-
ing a broad field for judicial making of rules, illustrate the trend
towards restoring the regulation of procedure to the judiciary.
In matters concerning control of the bar, dual regulation has
also been manifest. As in matters of procedure the English
background determines the limits. Parliament's power cannot
42 Ex parte Le Mond (1922) 295 Mo. 586, 245 S. W. 1057; State v. Shu-
maker (Ind. 1928) 164 N. E. 408.
4S Conley v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 1929.
44 Michaelson v. U. S. (1924) 266 U. S. 42.
45 (Cal. 1918) 177 Pac. 162.
46 Ex parte Greasy (1912) 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W. 914.
47 Carter v. Commonwealth (1899) 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780, and cases
collected in 36 L. R. A. 253. See also Fort v. Co-operative Farmers' Ex.
(Colo. 1927) 256 Pac. 319.
48 (1931) 15 Jr. of Am. Jud. Soc. 14.
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be held analogous to the powers possessed by legislatures of this
country.49 Ancient judicial practice, however, does determine
the limits of judicial power under our governments. 50 It has been
well said: "In matters of power over attorneys at law, the judi-
cial branch is either wholly slave to the legislative branch or
wholly free from its domination."' 51 Ancient exercise of a power
does not absolutely establish the power. There must be a
source.52 It is universally held that the right to practice law is
not a natural or constitutional right.53 The implication is that
the right is attendant with restrictions and qualifications. The
issue is which department of our governments can constitution-
ally limit or qualify. In all our governments, the legislature ex-
ercises police powers, the judiciary judicial powers. Regulation
may fall within both powers. In Illinois, the legislature enacted
a statute making the practice of law by a corporation unlawful.5'
The court, nevertheless, regulated such practice independently of
this statute even though the corporation could not appear before
it naturally.55 The statute was an exercise of the police power;
the court action an exercise of an inherent judicial power. It is
apparent that the independence of a department in its rightful
regulation may either be qualified by implication, or sustained by
the superior position of the department.
The judicial extent of regulation of the bar is influenced by
what the English practice was at the time our government became
independent. From the beginning, the regulation of members
of the bar was an inherent function of the English courts.56
Parliament, at times, has regulated, but its regulation has recog-
nized the inherent right of the courts. 57 It is often stated that
'9 State v. Cannon (Wis. 1932) 240 N. W. 441.
50 See State v. Harmon, note 1, supra.
1 In re Cate (Cal. 1928) 270 Pac. 968, a logical argument sustaining the
exclusive independent judicial regulation of these matters.
5:2 In re Cate, note 51, supra; McCulloch v. Maryland, note 15, supra.
8' Statev. Rossman (1929) 53 Wash. 1, 101 Pac. 357; Ex parte Yale (1863)
24 Cal. 241; In re Gibbs (Ariz. 1929) 278 Pac. 391; State v. Rosborough
(1922) 152 La. 945, 94 So. 858; In re Bailey (1926) 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29;
In re McDonald (Ind. 1928) 164 N. E. 26; State Bd. v. Phelan (Wyo. 1931)
5 Pac. (2d) 263.
54 Ill. Rev. St. (Smith-Hurd 1929) ch. 32, secs. 411-5.
55 People v. People's Stockyards State Bank (1931) 344 fll. 462, 176 N. E.
901. See In re Morse (1924) 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550.
56 In re Day (1899) 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646; State Bd. v. Phelan, note 53,
supra; State v. Cannon, note 49, supra.
.7 State v. Cannon, note 49, supra. See (1899) 13 Harv. L. Rev. 233.
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the judicial control over admissions sprang from the statute 4
Henry IV, c. 18, and is therefore a statutory origin while the
right to disbar was an inherent common law right.58 Since this
statute, the Inns of Court, which are voluntary, unincorporated
associations, have determined the applicants to practice before
the bench. These Inns have always been under the supervision
of the courts.59 Parliament may regulate the bench and the bar
as a superior power.60 In statute 54, 9 and 10 Vict., it gave the
barristers equal right and privilege before the common pleas as
the sergeants at law. Nothing short of an act of Parliament
could accomplish this. English courts could exercise the power
of conducting general inquisitions into the general conduct of
their attorneys.61 Whether the history of the admission of at-
torneys in England justifies the exercise of control over the bar
by the legislature depends on how analogous it is made to super-
visory regulation by Parliament. Yet it is stated in In re Day :02
"Whatever the English practice may have been, the question must
be what the nature of the power is, and whether it is one which
naturally pertains to the court. If it is judicial in its nature, the
legislatures are expressly prohibited from exercising it." This
statement emphasizes the logical approach to whether the judici-
ary may regulate the bar independently of the legislature. It is
not to be determined wholly by English practice but also by in-
terpretation of the power under our framework of government.
It is almost universally conceded that the judiciary has an in-
herent independent power over the act of admission of attorneys
to the bar.63 The act is regarded as an exclusive judicial function
58 State v. Kirkc (1869) 12 Fla. 278; In re Mills (1844) 1 Mich. 392; In re
Robinson (1907) 48 Wash. 153, 92 Pac. 929; State v. Raynolds (1916) 22
N. M. 1, 158 Pac. 413; Ex parte Bradley (1868)74 U. S. 364. See 44 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1195.
59 "But all the power they have concerning the admission to the bar, is
delegated to them from the judges, and, in every instance their conduct is
subject to their control as visitors." Lord Mansfield in The King against
the Benchers of Gray's Inn, on the Prosecution of William Hart. (1778)
1 Doug. Rep. 353.
60 State v. Cannon, note 49, supra.
63 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culken (1928) 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487.
62 See note 56, supra.
63 Brydonjack v. State Bar (Cal. 1929) 281 Pac. 1018; O'Brien's Petition
(1906) 79 Conn. 46, 63 Atl. 777. State v. Cannon (1928) 196 Wis. 534, 221
N. W. 603; see 6 C. J. 572. In all the states except New Jersey (In re Raisch(1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 Atl. 12) attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so ad-
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and not merely ministerial.64 Mandamus will not lie from a
superior court to compel admission by a lower court.65
The exercise of the power to prescribe qualifications for appli-
cants to the bar brings out the conflict between the legislative and
judicial departments. It is doubtful whether there is authority
for the principle that the courts have the sole right to prescribe
for themselves the qualifications of members of the bar and rules
and regulations for their admission without interference by a co-
ordinate branch of the government. In re Day is often cited for
this view. In this case a statute requiring admission to the bar
if the applicant possessed a degree from an established law school
of the state was held invalid as an encroachment by the legislature
on the judicial powers. Yet it is difficult to uphold this case as
establishing the principle for which it is cited because the court
admits that the legislature may prescribe reasonable police
regulations. In re Splane's Petition,6 presents the view as dicta
since the decision concerned an application for mandamus to
compel a lower court to admit. Conversely, however, there is
support for the view that the legislature may enact the ultimate
qualifications and that the judiciary has no right to exact addi-
tional requirements. In re Cooper is the leading case in sup-
port.617 The legislature of New York required admittance of
graduates of a certain law school to the bar without examination.
Basing the decision on its interpretation of the English law as it
existed at the time the New York constitution was adopted, it
held that the regulation of bar requirements was entirely within
the realm of legislation. A North Carolina case has also held
that admission is not an inherent judicial power, but one falling
entirely within the exercise of police powers.68
mitting. In West Virginia, a distinction is made between the granting of
the license and the act of admission.
64 Ex parte Garland (1867) 4 Wall. 333; Ex parte Secomb (1856) 19
How. 9; and cases cited in note 63, supra.
65 Ex parte Garland, note 64, supra; Ex parte Secome, note 64, supra;
Splane's Petition (1899) 123 Pa. 527, 57 Atl. 731.
6 See note 65, spra.
' (1860) 22 N. Y. 67.
In re Applicants for License (1906) 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, 10 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 288. The reporter to the note said: "Aside from the above case, no
case can be found wherein the court holds or recognizes the right of the legis-
lature to encroach upon the right of the court to require that the attorneys
practicing before it shall be of a good moral character." Besides the Cooper
case and this, there is support in In re Bowers (1918) 138 Tenn. 662, 200
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Neither expresses the prevailing view. It is conceded in
perhaps all other jurisdictions that the legislature may make
reasonable regulations that will be followed by the courts, in
exercising the power of admission. 69 In State Board v. Phekan70
it is said: "Submission by the courts to such regulations need not
be viewed as an abdication of power, but as showing the willing-
ness of the judiciary to recognize and follow statutory regulations
that do not put an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of the
power." Determination by the court whether a restraint is
reasonable or not is said to deny a "power" in the legislature to
regulate.71 But what its exercise is termed does not evade its
effects. Although a Massachusetts court has recently denied the
binding effect of legislative acts over courts in matters of control
of the bar, it nevertheless expresses respect for statutes which
may afford "appropriate instrumentalities" for the ascertainment
of qualifications of applicants. 72 All courts recognize the im-
portant function of the legislature in promoting public welfare
by protecting the public from the result of incompetence, impo-
sition, and fraud on the part of those who assume to practice
professions requiring special training. Yet, as said in State v.
Cannon: "It is apparent, however, that the judiciary may have
another and different interest in the talents, qualifications and
character of those who are to become officers of the court . .
There is no cited case in which the courts have evaded reasonable
S. W. 821, holding that board of examiners created by legislature had ulti-
mate power to decide fitness of applicants. In re Cooper has been distin-
guished on the basis that but one side of the case was presented on appeal
and that the brief presented misinterpreted or misunderstood the English
law. See 13 Harv. L. Rev. 233, and In re Day, note 56, supra. The North
Carolina case goes back to 1777 for precedents and at that time a parlia-
mentary system of government existed in the state. The year after this
case, the legislature enacted a law giving the court discretion as to fitness.
The dissent in In re Applicants for License to Practice (1910) 67 W. Va.
213, 67 S. E. 597 also supports this view of legislative power. Contra cases
are: Ih re Humphrey (Minn. 1929) 227 N. W. 179; In re Grantham (Minn.
1929) 227 N. W. 180; Hanson v. Gratton (1911) 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646;
State v. Cannon, note 49, supra (legislative act of admission) ; In re Edwards
(Idaho 1928) 266 Pac. 665. See Code of Ala. (1923) sec. 6226, for provision
making degree from a certain law school conclusive as to ability.
69 State v. Cannon, note 49, supra; Brydonjack v. State Bar, note 63, supra;
and see note, 66 A. L. R. 1512.
70 See note 53, supra.
71 In re Cate, note 51, supra; In re Goodell (1879) 39 Wis. 232, 81 N. W.
551; Hanson v. Gratton, note 68, supra; In re Bailey, note 53, supra.
7 In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass. 1932) 180 N. E. 725.
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requirements; the extent of the assertion of their independence
being that of exercising strict oversight and summary power
over the position of attorney. In other words, the ultimate
power over admission is jealously guarded by the courts; and so
it is held that the power of the legislature over the courts in ju-
dicial matters is limited, and can in no way be exercised so as to
impair the actual independence of the judiciary; and that the
control by the legislative department of admission to the bar, so
far as it exists under the usual American constitution, is at most
a power to prevent the admission of unsuitable persons.
The discipline and removal of attorneys is universally recog-
nized as inherent in all courts. In England, the statute 4 Henry
IV c. 18, is the first expression by Parliament on removal or dis-
barment. It was enacted with the intent of correcting a public
evil resulting from ignorant men professing to act as attorneys.
The courts always possessed the right to discipline independently
of statute.78 For this reason it is often held that the power is a
common law power while the power to admit is statutory.74 But
for the purposes of determining the independence of the judiciary
in matters pertaining to the bar, the courts' inherent powers ap-
plied to both at the time our freedom was established. A court's
right to discipline does not depend on whether it has a power to
admit. 75 There may be legislative regulations of this inherent
power to discipline only so far as restricting or broadening the
effect of the discipline on other courts.76 In Weeks on Attorneys
at Law77 it is said: "The power to strike from the rolls is in-
herent in the court itself. No statute or rule is necessary to
authorize the punishment in proper cases. Statutes and rules
may regulate the power, but they do not create it.7 8 . . . And
where certain grounds are specified by the statute, this does not
necessarily exclude striking from the rolls for causes not speci-
fied."' 79 In People v. Culkin,8o the power of the court to direct a
73 See (1844) 4 Law Times 102, concerning statute 3 Edw. I c. 29.
74 See note 58, supra, for cases.
75 State v. Raynolds, note 58, supra; State v. Kirkc, note 58, supra.
76 Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light (1923) 137 Va. 249, 119 S. E. 55.
77 Sec. 80.
78 In re Zirinsky (1932) 255 N. Y. S. 492.
79 In re Sadder (1913) 35 Okla. 510, 130 Pac. 906.
so See note 61, supra; and see Rubin v. State (1927) 194 Wis. 207, 216
N. W. 513.
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general inquiry into the conduct of attorneys was upheld on the
basis of the common law as it existed in England when New York
adopted its constitution. There is a conflict in the courts as to
whether disbarment may lie for acts disconnected with the prac-
tice. 81 Those cases declaring that it does not, base their hold-
ings on the ground that such discipline or disbarment is not
within the inherent power of the court generally to discipline and
disbar. There would seem to be no distinction in determining
moral fitness to continue in the profession based on professional
or non-professional conduct.
The courts are not as free to disbar as they are to discipline.
When a legislative act enumerates certain offenses, it is generally
held that these are not restrictive on the court's power to disbar
for other acts.8 2 However, the commission of an offense so
enumerated is generally held to be conclusive on the courts to dis-
bar.8 3 This is the Missouri law.8 4
The constitutional independence of the court may also arise in
connection with the procedure in disbarment proceedings. The
weight of authority holds that such a proceeding is not criminal
in its nature, but rather civil, or even sui generis and so controlled
by special rules.85 The proceedings are also held generally not
for the purpose of punishment, but rather for regulation of the
profession.8 6 It is also held that technical pleadings are not re-
quired and that the main purpose of pleadings is achieved if
ample notice is given.87 Since the courts are held to have an in-
81 In re Sadder, cited note 79, supra, restricts to professional misconduct
but In re Platz (1913) 42 Utah 439, 132 Pac. 390, and In re Durant (1903)
80 Conn. 140, 67 Atl. 497, hold that discipline and disbarment may be for non-
professional as well.
82 Wolfe's Disbarment (Pa. 1927) 135 Atl. 732; Howe v. State Bar, (Cal.
1931) 298 Pac. 25; People v. Berezniak (1920) 292 Ill. 305, 127 N. E. 36.
But see Re Ebbs (1908) 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190, and Re Haywood (1872)
66 N. C. 1, upholding legislative grounds as exclusive. If held exclusive, it
would seem that the right to disbar is not as inherent in the court as the
right to punish for contempt.
83 In re Elliott (1927) 122 Okla. 180, 253 Pac. 103; In re Collins (1922)
188 Cal. 701, 206 Pac. 990.
84 In re Wallace (1929) 323 Mo. 203, 19 S. W. (2d) 625.85 Philbrook v. Newman (C. C. Cal. 1898) 85 F. 139; In re Ulmer (1929)
268 Mass. 373, 167 N. E. 749. See (1921) 5 Minn. L. Rev. 141. Contra:
In re Eaton (N. D. 1931) 235 N. W. 587.
86 In re Egan (1928) 52 S. D. 394, 218 N. W. 1; State v. Ledbetter (1927)
127 Okla. 85, 260 Pac. 454; Ex parte Wall (1882) 107 U. S. 265.87 Bar Ass'n v. Scott (1911) 209 Mass. 200, 95 N. E. 402.
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herent right to disbar, the courts generally sustain non-statutory
proceedings.88 In recent cases, statutes providing for jury trials
in such proceedings have been upheld.8 9
The legislative power of taxation may bring out a constitutional
conflict with the judicial control of members of the bar. If the
tax is for revenue only, the act is generally upheld. 90 If it is for
regulation, an effective restraint on the judiciary must be brought
out more clearly than by mere implication.9 1 It is apparent that
this power of taxation may be made an effective regulation of the
bar.
Other restrictions on judicial independence in control of
the bar may be made by legislative application of the statute of
limitations; or by an implied denial to disbar as an attorney, one
who holds a public trust.9 3 Even where the office required the
holder to be an attorney and the constitution provided for re-
moval, the court exercised its inherent power to disbar.94
Judicial independence of the legislature has been more widely
asserted in matters concerning the bar than in matters of pro-
cedure. Both phases of the administration of justice should,
logically, independently be regulated by the judiciary. Public
opinion, the bar, and the press should prove sufficient checks if the
judicial department does assert its independence. "The judges
are best qualified to determine what experience requires and how
the rule is working." 95
'8 In re Royall (1930) 34 N. M. 554, 286 Pac. 156; State Bar Comm. v.
Sullivan (1915) 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703. Contra: In re Herron (Cal.
1930) 291 Pac. 164; Grievance Committee v. Strickland (1931) 200 N. C.
630, 158 S. E. 110. See (1932) 10 N. C. L. Rev. 58.
89 State Board v. Phelan, cited note 53, supra; Verimont v. State (1911)
101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W. 194.
90 Goldwaite v. Montgomery (1876) 50 Ala. 486; Lent v. Portland (1903)
42 Or. 488, 71 Pac. 645.
91 Goldwaite v. Montgomery, note 90, supra; State v. Gazlay (1831) 5 Ohio
14; In re Gibson (N. M. 1931) 4 Pac. (2d) 643.
92 State v. Jennings (S. C. 1931) 159 S. E. 627.
93 In re Stolen (Wis. 1927) 214 N. W. 379; Danforth v. Egan (1909) 23
S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021.
94 In re Stolen, note 93, supra.
95 Pound, Regulation of Jud. Procedure, note 3, supra.
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